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Abstract
Purpose – This study aims to examine the effect on stock returns of 28 terrorist and military events
occurring between 1963 and 2012. The authors divide the sample and examine these attacks on the basis
of industry, country targeted, location, terrorism versus militarism and predicted overall impact.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors measure the effects of the events in our sample along
several dimensions: in the aggregate; comparatively across industries; by each event’s predicted level of
impact; by the type of event (terrorist versus military); by the location of the attack (USA or outside the
USA); and by whether the USA was, directly or by proxy, the primary target of the attack.
Findings – Stock returns are significantly lower for those industries predicted to be most hurt than for
other industries. Events that the authors predict to be of high impact to the market are followed by
significantly lower returns than events we predict to be of low impact. Stocks perform significantly worse on
the days of terrorist events than on the days of military events, but the opposite is true for the day after.
Significantly lower returns follow events that occur inside the USA or where the USA was the primary target.
Research limitations/implications – This study focuses on 28 high-profile events over a 50-year
period and makes several new contributions to the literature. The authors find compelling
cross-sectional differences between stock returns at the industry level as well as predictable differences
in mean returns between events. The authors distinguish between terrorist and military attacks and
also separate the sample geographically.
Practical implications – The authors believe that this study can help researchers and investors more
deeply understand the overall market and industry effects of significant terrorist and military events.
Social implications – By offering a thorough examination of the differences between high-profile
attacks in the context of stock returns both on the day of and the day immediately following those
attacks, the authors hope that people will be able to better grasp the likelihood and magnitude of the
initial damage done by these attacks as well as the subsequent recovery.
Originality/value – Most studies that examine the effects of terrorism on the stock market focus on
one or two specific events or stock market locations. They also tend to concentrate on very specific
characteristics of the attack(s) that they examine, such as the size of the market or the aggregate effect
to that market. The authors study 28 high-profile events over a 50-year period and examine them by
industry, country targeted, location, terrorism versus militarism and predicted overall impact. This
study presents many new results using these classifications.
Keywords Event studies, Stock returns, Terrorism, Militarism
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Several studies have examined the effect of terrorism on stock returns. In this paper, we
attempt to add to and expand upon that literature by using a sample of both terrorist and
military events, largely compiled from documents issued by the US Department of State,
over the period 1963-2012. We measure the effects of the events in our sample along
several dimensions: in the aggregate; comparatively across industries; by each event’s
predicted level of impact; by the type of event (terrorist versus military); by the location
of the attack (USA or outside the USA); and by whether the USA was, directly or by
proxy, the primary target of the attack. In addition to confirming some of the findings of
the pre-existing literature, we also provide some new results that hopefully will add to
our body of knowledge in this area.
Studies on terrorism vary considerably, but most are specific in some way. For
example, many focus on just one or a few events, a short time period or on specific types
of events. Karolyi (2006) summarizes much of the financial and economic research on the
effects of terrorism. This research finds that, generally, acts of terrorism do in fact hurt
the stock market. Arin et al. (2008) find that terrorism affects both the returns and the
volatility of stocks, especially in emerging markets. Baumert et al. (2013) argue that
while the market indeed reacts to terrorism, the effect has diminished in recent years,
while Kollias et al. (2011) find no clear pattern or change over time for data specific to the
London and Athens exchanges. Similar to Arin et al. (2008), however, the authors do find
that the smaller market (Athens) is more sensitive to terrorist attacks than is the larger
market (London). Kollias et al. (2011) examined the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London
attacks and found widespread negative returns in Spain along with a slower market
rebound following the attack. Other studies focusing on specific events include Chen
and Seims (2004), Berrebi and Klor (2005), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Guidolin
and La Ferrara (2005).
Some studies consider the effects of terrorism from other angles. For example,
Johnston and Nedelescu (2006) study the September 11, 2001, New York City and 2004
Madrid attacks from both a market reaction and crisis management standpoint.
Chesney et al. (2011) compare terrorism to financial crashes and natural disasters and
give investment advice on which industries offer better diversification and better
protection against the acts of terrorism on the whole.
Finally, Karolyi and Martell (2006) examine 75 attacks targeting publicly traded
firms between the years 1995 and 2002. The authors find a negative stock market return
around such events, especially for those attacks that involved “human capital losses”
such as kidnappings. Interestingly, there is not much industry-level research on the
impact of terrorism. Much of the research that does exist in this area focuses on 9/11.
Cummins and Lewis (2003) examine the effect of the attacks on September 11, 2001, on
property/casualty insurers, Brown et al. (2004) on insurance companies, Kallberg et al.
(2005) on real estate investment trusts (REITs) and Doherty et al. (2003) also on
insurance companies. Alternatively, Drakos and Khutan (2003) examine the effect of
terrorist attacks on the tourism industry in Greece, Israel and Turkey.
This study corroborates the general findings in the existing literature and also
provides some new results. First, we examine a broad sample of 28 large-scale terrorist
and military events occurring over a nearly 50-year period beginning with the
assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963 and ending with the attack on the US Embassy
in Libya on September 11, 2012. The breadth of this sample differs from most of the
existing literature on this topic. Second, we examine each event on an industry level and
compare the effects on industries that we predict to be most damaged by the event to
other industries. Third, we compare events that we predict to be of high impact to events
that we predict to be of low impact in the context of overall stock returns. Fourth, we
distinguish between terrorism and militarism by classifying each event as one or the
other and then comparing the two groups on the basis of its attendant stock returns.
Finally, we study the effects of terrorism and militarism based on the location of the
attack (within the USA versus outside the USA) and on the target of the attack (USA or
non-USA).
We structure the rest of our paper as follows. Section 2 describes the sample
construction and methods of the study. Section 3 provides some overall results of the
effect of terrorism and militarism on the market. Section 4 examines the data in more
detail by distinguishing between industries, the predicted levels of impact for the
different events and the types of events. Section 5 focuses on the location of the attack
and the location of the target. Section 6 describes the results of six multiple regressions
involving the set of predictor variables developed in the previous sections. Section 7
concludes the study.
2. Data and methods
We originally selected several major terrorist incidents from the US Department of
State’s archive of “Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology” file,
which outlines roughly 250 events occurring between 1961 and 2003. We intended to
focus on some of the largest and most notorious events, and the online chronology
(which can be available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm) was
very helpful in doing so. We added a significant military event, the beginning of the 1991
Gulf War, by using a chronology of the war that was published by USA Today: http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/index/iraq/nirq050.htm. We also consulted “Johnston’s
Archive” (www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255a.html), which is sourced from
US government releases, research papers from historic organizations and mainstream
news archives and the FBI’s “Major Terrorism Cases” file (www.fbi.gov/about-us/
investigate/terrorism/terrorism_cases), to round out our sample. From these lists of
terrorist attacks and military incidents, we ended up selecting 28 events. We then
predicted each event to have either a high, medium or low impact on the market, we
designated each event as either “terrorism” or “military”, each event location as
domestic (USA) or foreign and each event by whether the USA was the primary country
targeted. Table I presents all of the events in our sample along with their dates, times
and various designations. Although our sample concentrates more heavily in the past
two decades, almost half of the events occur between 1963 and 1993, with the rest
occurring between 1995 and 2012. Overall, we predict four events to have high impact on
the market (versus 11 having medium impact and 13 having low impact), we classify 23
of the events as terrorism and 5 as militarism, 6 of the events occurred in the USA while
22 occurred outside the USA, and the USA was the “target” country 12 times, while other
countries were the primary target 16 times.
For each event, we calculate both the equally weighted and value-weighted returns
for all stocks included in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database for
the day of and day immediately following the event. The reader can consider these
returns to be “normal”, “market” or “unadjusted” returns. If the event occurred after 4:00
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p.m. Eastern Time, we use the following two trading days instead. We examine these
returns both in isolation and in comparison with market returns occurring on non-event
days. We also predict which industries will be most adversely affected by each event
and then divide the sample along two-digit and four-digit SIC codes on that basis to
compare the event-period returns to the two industry groups. We provide more details
on our industry-level analysis in Section 4 of this study.
3. Aggregate effects of terrorism and militarism
We begin by examining the overall effects of our sample of terrorist and military events
on the stock market. Table II presents the results. In the left portion of Panel A, we
produce the mean returns to all companies in the CRSP database across all 28 events for
both the day of and the day immediately following the event. The results, though
non-trivial (and highly statistically significant), are nonetheless not economically
devastating. On the day of the event, the average firm’s stock fell roughly one-quarter of
one percentage point. On the next trading day, the average stock recovered all of that
initial loss and then some. The middle and right portions of Panel A show similar results
for the day of the attack, along with a more-than-full recovery on the day after. Because
the numbers shown are average market portfolio returns (value-weighted in the middle
portion of Panel A and equally weighted in the right-hand portion) over the 28 events,
the sample thus consists of only 28 observations and the results are generally
insignificant.
Table II.
Mean event-period
returns
Day
Mean returns across all firms
for all events
Value-weighted market
portfolio returns
(mean of 28 events)
Equally-weighted market
portfolio returns
(mean of 28 events)
N Return (%) t-statistic N Return (%) t-statistic N Return (%) t-statistic
Panel A
0 175,166 0.200 16.45*** 28 0.279 0.95 28 0.218 0.87
1 175,166 0.246 20.14*** 28 0.622 1.99* 28 0.353 1.45
Event?
Value-weighted market portfolio
returns (Day 0)
Equally-weighted market portfolio
returns (Day 0)
N Return (%) t-statistic N Return (%) t-statistic
Panel B
Yes 28 0.279 0.95 28 0.218 0.87
No 12,558 0.043 4.88*** 12,558 0.079 10.59***
Difference
(Yes  No) 0.322 1.10 0.298 1.18
Notes: The table above provides mean returns to individual stocks and to value- and equally-weighted
portfolios of stocks on the trading day of and immediately following the 28 terrorist or military attacks
in our sample; the left portion of panel A shows the mean return to all of the stocks in the CRSP database
on those days; the center and right portions provide the value- and equally-weighted returns,
respectively; Panel B compares the mean value- and equally-weighted market returns on the day of the
event to the mean returns on other days. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1%
level; ** significance at the 5% level; and * significance at the 10% level
Panel B of Table II compares the equally- and value-weighted market portfolio returns
on the days of terrorist and military events to other days. As expected, the returns on
other days are slightly positive, reflecting the small daily expected return to investing in
the stock market. On event days, the average return is roughly 0.3 per cent lower than for
non-event days (one can consider this an abnormal market return of 0.3 per cent when
benchmarked against days that are not affected by terrorist or military events). Again,
however, the relatively small number of events in our sample renders the difference
statistically insignificant.
Table III shows the mean return across all companies in the CRSP database for each
of the 28 events in our sample. The results vary considerably, with a significantly
negative market return occurring on the day of 12 of those events, but with significant
positive returns occurring on the day of many other events. The most extreme of these
events, from the perspective of the mean same-day stock return, was the September 11,
Table III.
Stock returns across
all companies for
each event
Date Event OBS.
Mean
return (%) t-statistic
22 November 1963, John F. Kennedy Assassinated 2,052 2.916 28.21***
21 July 1972 Bloody Friday 2,625 0.590 12.19***
5 September 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre 2,637 0.296 6.50***
24 January 1975 Wall Street Bombing 1,958 3.027 26.75***
31 August 1981 US Installation Bombing 5,149 0.788 19.61***
18 April 1983 Beirut US Embassy Bombing 5,478 0.639 12.81***
14 June 1985 TWA Hijacking 6,238 0.331 7.59***
21 December 1988 Pan Am 103 Bombing 6,932 0.038 0.71
30 November 1989 German Bank Chairman Assassinated 6,760 0.170 3.10***
2 August 1990 Iraq Invades Kuwait 6,765 0.874 13.92***
16 January 1991 Start of the First Gulf War 6,681 2.327 26.99***
26 February 1993 World Trade Center Bombing 6,989 0.709 9.69***
19 April 1995 Bombing of Fed. Bldg. in Oklahoma City 8,197 0.185 3.29***
23 February 1997 Empire State Bldg. Sniper Attack 6,729 0.088 1.42
7 August 1998 US Embassy Bombings in East Africa 8,974 1.357 23.29***
12 October 2000 Attack on USS. Cole 8,258 2.081 30.23***
11 September 2001 Terrorist Attacks on US Homeland 7,492 4.247 36.83***
7 October 2001 Official Start of “Operation Enduring
Freedom”
7,491 0.202 2.94***
23 January 2002 Kidnapping of Daniel Pearl 7,350 0.559 11.46***
12 October 2002 Car Bomb Explosion in Bali 7,014 0.346 5.05***
19 March 2003 Official Start of “Operation Iraqi Freedom” 6,758 0.410 7.66***
11 March 2004 Train Bombings in Spain 6,543 1.180 32.32***
7 July 2005 Bus and Train Bombings in London, I 6,727 0.139 4.81***
25 July 2005 Bus and Train Bombings in London, II 6,662 0.425 11.31***
11 July 2006 Train Bombings in India 6,726 0.326 9.97***
14 August 2007 Coordinated Car Bombings in Iraq 6,937 1.753 43.57***
2 May 2011 Bin Laden Killed in Pakistan 6,428 0.908 26.05***
11 September 2012 US Embassy Attack in Libya 6,616 0.393 11.32***
Notes: The table above provides the date, the event, the number of firms for which adequate returns
data exist in the CRSP database and the mean return of all companies on the date of the attack for all
events in our sample; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the
5% level; and *denotes significance at the 10% level
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City (4.25 per cent), the 1975
Wall Street bombing (3.03 per cent) and the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy in the November of 1963 (2.92 per cent). In summary, the results for
individual events and for the overall market are quite mixed. In the next section of this
study, we focus on these 28 events at the levels of industry, predicted impact and type of
event (terrorist versus military).
4. Analysis by industry, predicted impact and type of event
4.1 Predicted industry impact
For each event, we predicted which industries we thought would be most negatively
affected. In general, we predicted the finance and banking, insurance and travel and
tourism industries to be the most adversely affected by the events in our sample, but the
specific industries predicted to be hurt naturally varied by event. For example, we
predicted the September 11 terrorist attacks to have a wider-ranging impact across
industries than the TWA hijacking in the June of 1985, which we expected to primarily
affect travel and tourism. Appendix provides the list of industries that we predicted to
be the most negatively influenced by each event.
Table IV provides the day-of, day-after and day-of-and-after returns for two groups
of firms. The first group consists of those companies for which the dichotomous variable
BadInd equals 1. These firms operate in at least one industry predicted to be the most
negatively affected by the event of that day, and represent about 22 per cent of our
overall sample. The results in Table IV bear out our predictions. On the day of the event,
Table IV.
Mean event-period
returns by industry
(predicted impact of
attack)
BadInd N
Day 0 returns Day 1 returns Days [0, 1] returns
Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic
Panel A
1 37,972 0.267 12.69*** 0.142 6.97*** 0.149 5.62***
0 137,194 0.182 12.62*** 0.274 18.90*** 0.059 3.02***
Difference
(0  1) 0.086 3.35*** 0.132 5.26*** 0.208 6.32***
N
Day 0 return sign Day 1 return sign Days [0, 1] return sign
Mean rank t-statistic Return t-statistic Return t-statistic
Panel B
1 37,972 0.083 17.67*** 0.072 15.52*** 0.001 0.23
0 137,194 0.068 27.68*** 0.006 2.51** 0.033 12.67***
Difference
(0  1) 0.015 2.85*** 0.066 12.58*** 0.034 6.08***
Notes: Panel A below compares the day-of, day-after and two-day mean return for those companies
that we predict to be more negatively affected by the events in our sample, based on the industries in
which they operate, to the mean return of those that we predict to be less negatively affected; Panel B
makes a similar comparison on the basis of the mean sign of the returns for the two groups, where we
assign a value of 1 to a positive stock return, zero to a return of zero and 1 to a negative
return; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and
*denotes significance at the 10% level
shares of stock from the industries that we predicted to be the most negatively affected
performed significantly worse than the stocks of other industries. Moreover, while
stocks from other industries experienced a more-than-full rebound the following day,
stocks for which BadInd  1 experienced only a half recovery from the losses of the day
before. Panel B reports the mean sign of the return (1 for a positive return, zero for a
return of zero and 1 for a negative return); the results are the same for the day of the
event, but the signs reverse for the day after the event. In sum, we can say for certain that
on the day of the event, the firms that were most damaged by the event were those that
we predicted would be.
4.2 Predicted event impact
It is also likely that different events will have effects of different magnitudes on stock
returns overall. We predict each event to be of high, medium or low impact and then
compare the returns for all companies across those three categories of events. While
these predictions are necessarily subjective and therefore debatable, we attempt to
categorize each event on the basis of both the amount (and intensity) of the media
generated and the likely economic implications of the event. By doing this, we hope to
capture in our predictions both the expected material economic effects on stock returns
as well as the psychological (including behavioral) effects. The events that we predicted
to be of high impact on the stock market were the start of the first gulf war (January
1991), the bombing of the World Trade Center (February 1993), the attacks of September
11, 2001, and the start of the war in Afghanistan (October 2001). We predicted all of the
other events in the sample to be of either medium or low impact[1].
Table V presents results that are again consistent with our initial hypothesis. Events
of predicted high and medium impact resulted in significantly negative stock returns,
with predicted high-impact events turning out to be the most damaging with a mean
stock return of 0.45 per cent. Stock returns on the days of events predicted to be of low
impact were not significantly different from zero. In addition, stock returns for predicted
high-impact events were again significantly negative on the day following the event,
resulting in a two-day loss of 0.83 per cent. When we examine only the sign of each
company’s return and ignore its magnitude (Panel B), there is no significant difference
on the day zero between the predicted high-impact and predicted low-impact events. It is
perhaps not surprising that it is in the magnitude of the returns where the difference
between predicted high- and low-impact terrorist acts lies. In any event, the mean
two-day return sign is significantly lower for predicted high-impact events than for
predicted low-impact events, similar to the results in Panel A, which include the
magnitude of the returns.
4.3 Type of event
The events in our sample differ also by whether they are terrorist attacks or military
events. There are five military events in our sample:
(1) the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (August 1990);
(2) the start of the first war in Iraq (January 1991);
(3) the start of the war in Afghanistan (October 2001);
(4) the start of the second war in Iraq (March 2003); and
(5) the killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan (May 2011).
We classify each of the other 23 events in the sample as a terrorist attack.
Table VI yields some interesting results. While stock returns are significantly
negative on the days of terrorist attacks and significantly positive on the days of
military events, the reverse is true for the trading day that immediately follows. The
mean two-day stock performance, it turns out, is actually lower (more negative) for
military events than it is for terrorist attacks. We obtain similar results when we focus
only on the sign and ignore the magnitude of the returns, with the exception that there
is no significant difference between the mean stock return signs on the day of the event
for the two categories of events. In any case, it is interesting to note the opposite
reversals for the two types of events, and we leave it to the reader to speculate on any
possible reasons for them.
5. Geographical analysis: the location and target of the attack
5.1 The location of the attack
We next divide our sample on the basis of whether the attack occurred inside the USA.
Out of 28 events, 6 occurred in the USA: the assassination of President John F. Kennedy
in 1963, the Wall Street bombing of 1975, the World Trade Center bombing of 1993, the
Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, the Empire State Building sniper attack of 1997 and
the attacks of September 11, 2001. These domestic events represent almost 20 per cent of
the stocks, across all event days, in our sample.
Table V.
Mean event-period
returns to all stocks
by aggregate impact
of attack
Predicted
impact N
Day 0 returns Day 1 returns Days [0, 1] returns
Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic
Panel A
H 28,653 0.448 9.63*** 0.321 7.95*** 0.830 14.64***
M 75,830 0.309 18.50*** 0.584 32.08*** 0.231 10.44***
L 70,683 0.006 0.37 0.145 8.81*** 0.130 5.68***
Difference
(H  L) 0.442 9.02*** 0.466 10.69*** 0.960 15.70***
N
Day 0 return sign Day 1 return sign Days [0, 1] return sign
Mean sign t-statistic Mean sign t-statistic Mean sign t-statistic
Panel B
H 28,653 0.071 13.30*** 0.085 16.17*** 0.109 19.32***
M 75,830 0.074 22.20*** 0.145 43.59*** 0.055 15.38***
L 70,683 0.068 20.20*** 0.055 16.48*** 0.069 19.59***
Difference
(H  L) 0.004 0.60 0.030 4.80*** 0.040 6.02***
Notes: Panel A compares the day-of, day-after and two-day mean return across all stocks for those
events that we predict to be of relative high, medium and low aggregate impact; The bottom row shows
the difference between the aggregate returns of predicted high- and of predicted low-impact events;
Panel B makes a similar comparison on the basis of the mean sign of the returns for the two groups,
where we assign a value of 1 to a positive stock return, zero to a return of zero and 1 to a negative
return; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and
*denotes significance at the 10% level
Table VII presents a comparison of stock returns on and immediately after the six domestic
events to those on and immediately following the 22 foreign events. The difference on the
day of the attack is highly significant, with attacks inside the USA generating a mean return
of 0.833 per cent versus only 0.051 per cent for foreign attacks. Interestingly, the returns
on the day after the event are not significantly different between the two groups; while
domestic attacks are followed by a recovery of about 1/3 the size of the initial loss, foreign
attacks are followed by a much greater gain than the initial loss. Panel B, in which we report
the results only for the sign of the return and not the magnitude, tells a similar story. Overall,
it appears that the universe of CRSP stocks is much more negatively affected by attacks that
occur within the USA than by attacks occurring elsewhere.
5.2 The target of the attack
The last round of analysis that we perform involves dividing the data by whether the
principal target of the attack was the USA. We designate the USA to be the principal
target of 12 of the 28 attacks in our sample. For us to designate the USA as the target, the
attack can come from within (e.g. the Oklahoma City bombing) or from without (e.g. the
September 11 attacks) and the attack need not take place on USA soil (e.g. the 1983 and
2012 attacks on the US embassies in Beirut and Libya, respectively, or the kidnapping of
journalist Daniel Pearl). Overall, events primarily targeting the USA comprise about
43 per cent of the stock-days in our sample.
Table VIII provides the results of this analysis. On the day of the attack, stocks
included in the CRSP database fell by an average of 0.355 per cent if the attack
principally targeted the USA and only 0.084 per cent if not. However, stock returns on
Table VI.
Mean event-period
returns to all stocks
by type of event
Event type N
Day 0 returns Day 1 returns Days [0, 1] returns
Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic
Panel A
Terrorism 141,043 0.285 21.34*** 0.389 28.99*** 0.073 4.09***
Military 34,123 0.148 5.03*** 0.348 12.12*** 0.232 5.96***
Difference
(T  M) 0.433 13.40*** 0.737 23.26*** 0.305 7.12***
N
Day 0 return sign Day 1 return sign Days [0, 1] return sign
Mean sign t-statistic Mean sign t-statistic Mean sign t-statistic
Panel B
Terrorism 141,043 0.072 30.02*** 0.058 23.95*** 0.006 2.26**
Military 34,123 0.065 13.15*** 0.133 27.39*** 0.106 20.70***
Difference
(T  M) 0.007 1.34 0.191 35.18*** 0.101 17.54***
Notes: Panel A compares the day-of, day-after and two-day mean return across all stocks for terrorist
attacks and military attacks; the bottom row shows the difference between the aggregate returns of
terrorist attacks and military attacks; Panel B makes a similar comparison on the basis of the mean sign
of the returns for the two groups, where we assign a value of 1 to a positive stock return, zero to a
return of zero and 1 to a negative return; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1%
level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *denotes significance at the 10% level
the day after attacks on the USA were higher than for other attacks, representing an
almost complete rebound in the case of the former. Still and all, the two-day returns were
lower around attacks on the USA than attacks on other countries. Panel B, however,
shows a difference in the mean sign of these returns, suggesting again that the
magnitude of individual stock returns is an important factor in the overall results.
6. Regression analysis
We estimate six regressions in an effort to determine the effects of all of the
aforementioned variables on event-period stock returns. In these regressions, we use
different combinations of five dummy variables:
(1) BadInd, which equals one if the company operates in an industry or industries that
we had predicted to be the most adversely affected by the attack and zero otherwise.
(2) High Impact, which equals one if we had predicted the attack to be of relatively high
market impact and zero if we had predicted the attack to be of medium or low impact.
(3) Terrorism, which equals one if we classified the attack as an act of terrorism and zero
if we classified it as a military attack.
(4) USA (Location), which equals one if the attack occurred inside the USA and zero
otherwise.
(5) USA (Target), which equals one if the USA was the primary target of the attack and
zero otherwise.
Table VII.
Mean event-period
returns to all stocks
by location of event
Location N
Day 0 returns Day 1 returns Days [0, 1] returns
Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic
Panel A
Domestic 33,417 0.833 21.75*** 0.273 7.69*** 0.609 12.22***
Foreign 141,749 0.051 4.26*** 0.239 19.09*** 0.160 9.85***
Difference
(D  F) 0.782 19.48*** 0.034 0.90 0.769 14.68***
N
Day 0 return sign Day 1 return sign Days [0, 1] return sign
Mean sign t-statistic Mean sign t-statistic Mean sign t-statistic
Panel B
Domestic 33,417 0.136 28.12*** 0.022 4.48*** 0.101 19.34***
Foreign 141,749 0.055 22.95*** 0.020 8.35*** 0.008 2.99***
Difference
(D  F) 0.081 14.88*** 0.002 0.30 0.093 16.06***
Notes: Panel A below compares the day-of, day-after and two-day mean returns across all stocks for
events that occur inside the USA to the returns of all stocks for events occurring outside the USA; the
bottom row shows the difference between the aggregate returns for the two groups of events; Panel B
makes a similar comparison on the basis of the mean sign of the returns for the two groups of events,
where we assign a value of 1 to a positive stock return, zero to a return of zero and 1 to a negative
return; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and
*denotes significance at the 10% level
For each of the three return windows that we examine (Day 0, Day 1 and Day 0 and Day
1 combined), we estimate two regressions. The first regression uses BadInd, High
Impact, Terrorism and USA (Location) as the predictor variables. The second also uses
BadInd, High Impact and Terrorism but replaces USA (Location) with USA (Target),
given that these are the two most highly correlated of the indicator variables and, in fact,
the cases in which USA (Location) equals one are a subset of the cases in which USA
(Target) equals one. For all of these regressions, we convert the response variable into
percentage terms, meaning that a value of 1.0 is equal to 1 per cent. Therefore, the reader
should interpret the coefficients in Table IX on the independent variables to be their
relative contributions in percentage points toward the total return for that period.
In all six regressions, the coefficient on BadInd is negative, indicating that those
firms operating in “bad” industries experience lower returns on both the day of and the
day after the attack. The coefficients for Day 1 are of marginal (two-tailed) significance,
however. The BadInd coefficient of 0.081 in the first regression suggests that
operating in an industry that we had predicted to be the most adversely affected by the
attack contributes about 0.08 per cent, in addition to the effects of the other variables,
toward the overall day-zero return for the average company. The coefficients on High
Impact, Terrorism, USA (Location) and USA (Target) are generally of greater
magnitude and significance than the coefficient on BadInd. Similar to our previous
results, we find that the events that we had predicted to be of high impact are
accompanied by lower returns, as are attacks located inside the USA. Attacks for which
the USA was the principal target may have lower returns; the coefficients are negative
Table VIII.
Mean event-period
returns to all stocks
by target of attack
Target N
Day 0 returns Day 1 returns Days [0, 1] returns
Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic
Panel A
USA 75,242 0.355 16.53*** 0.339 16.41*** 0.062 2.23***
Other 99,924 0.084 6.03*** 0.175 11.96*** 0.071 3.66***
Difference
(USA  Other) 0.271 10.58*** 0.164 6.47*** 0.013 3.92***
N
Day 0 return sign Day 1 return sign Days [0, 1] return sign
Mean sign t-statistic Mean sign t-statistic Mean sign t-statistic
Panel B
Domestic 75,242 0.048 14.54*** 0.036 11.05*** 0.015 4.29***
Foreign 99,924 0.088 30.69*** 0.009 3.00*** 0.033 10.97***
Difference
(D  F) 0.040 9.24*** 0.028 6.31*** 0.018 3.93***
Notes: Panel A compares the day-of, day-after and two-day mean returns across all stocks for events
that primarily target the USA to the returns of all stocks for events that primarily target other countries;
the bottom row shows the difference between the aggregate returns for the two groups of events; Panel
B makes a similar comparison on the basis of the mean sign of the returns for the two groups of events,
where we assign a value of 1 to a positive stock return, zero to a return of zero and 1 to a negative
return; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and
*denotes significance at the 10% level
Table IX.
Regressions of event-
period stock returns
on type of firm and
type of event
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but range from insignificant to highly significant. Terrorist attacks have significantly
lower returns than military attacks on Day 0, but significantly higher returns on Day 1.
These results suggest that the variables we predict to influence returns around terrorist
and military attacks do in fact help explain those returns, and in a manner, that is
generally consistent with the direction of our predictions.
7. Conclusions
While there are many studies that examine the effects of terrorism on the stock market,
most of those studies focus on one or two specific events or stock market locations (for
additional examples, see Nguyen and Enomoto, 2009; Hon et al., 2004). The studies in
this area also tend to concentrate on very specific characteristics of the attack(s) that
they examine, such as the size of the market affected or on the aggregate effect to that
market. The most comprehensive article to date (Karolyi and Martell (2006)) examines
attacks that occurred between 1995 and 2002 and thus omits many significant events
that occurred outside that window.
Our study focuses on 28 high-profile events over a 50-year period and makes several
new contributions to the literature. First, we find compelling cross-sectional differences
between stock returns at the industry level, depending on the nature of the event.
Second, we find that there are significant differences in mean returns between events
and that these differences can be predicted ex-ante, with predicted high-impact events
resulting in one- and two-day returns that are both significantly negative and
significantly below those of the other events. Third, we distinguish between terrorist
and military attacks and compare the event-period returns on that basis. Fourth, we
separate our sample on the basis of geography, first by the location of the attack and
then by the country primarily targeted (in both cases, we compare attacks inside or
targeting the USA to those inside or targeting other countries). We find that, once again,
the results are in keeping with our original predictions. Finally, we estimate six
regressions on stock returns for the day of and day following the events in our sample,
and find results that are consistent with our earlier analysis and conclusions.
We believe that this study can help researchers and investors to more deeply
understand the overall market and industry effects of significant terrorist and military
events. By offering a thorough examination of the differences between high-profile
attacks in the context of stock returns both on the day of and the day immediately
following those attacks, we hope that people will be able to better grasp the likelihood
and magnitude of the initial damage done by these attacks as well as the subsequent
recovery.
Note
1. To examine the robustness of these results, we perform an alternative set of predictions in
which we change the following categories of predicted market impact. We change the
predicted impact of Bloody Friday, the Munich Olympic Massacre, the Wall Street bombing,
the assassination of the German bank chairman, the US embassy bombing, the bombings in
Spain, the bombings in India, the bombings in Iraq and the killing of Osama bin Laden from
low to medium, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the Oklahoma City bombing from medium
to high, the World Trade Center bombing from high to medium and the attack on the USS Cole
from medium to low. The results are similar to Tables V and IX.
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Appendix. Industries predicted to be most adversely affected on the day of the
event, sorted chronologically by event
US President Assassinated, November 22, 1963.
Entertainment, Non-Essential Goods, Travel and Tourism, Finance and Banking.
“Bloody Friday”, July 21, 1972
Travel and Tourism.
Munich Olympic Massacre, September 5, 1972
Petroleum, Entertainment, Non-Essential Goods, Travel and Tourism.
Domestic Terrorism, January 27, 1975
Insurance, Finance and Banking.
US Installation Bombing, August 31, 1981
Non-Essential Goods, Travel and Tourism.
Bombing of US Embassy in Beirut, April 18, 1983
Petroleum, Finance and Banking.
TWA Hijacking, June 14, 1985
Travel and Tourism.
Pan Am 103 Bombing, December 21, 1988
Travel and Tourism.
Assassination of German Bank Chairman, November 30, 1989
Finance and Banking.
Iraq Invades Kuwait, August 2, 1990
Petroleum, Finance and Banking.
Start of the First Gulf War, January 16, 1991
Petroleum, Travel and Tourism, Finance and Banking.
World Trade Center Bombing, February 26, 1993
Insurance, Finance and Banking.
Bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, April 19, 1995
Non-Essential Goods, Travel and Tourism, Real Estate and Construction, Insurance, Finance and
Banking.
Empire State Building Sniper Attack, February 23, 1997
Travel and Tourism.
US Embassy Bombings in East Africa, August 7, 1998
Petroleum, Travel and Tourism, Finance and Banking.
Attack on USS Cole, October 12, 2000
Petroleum, Finance and Banking.
Terrorist Attacks on US Homeland, September 11, 2001
Petroleum, Entertainment, Non-Essential Goods, Travel and Tourism, Real Estate and
Construction, Insurance, Finance and Banking.
Start of Operation Enduring Freedom, the USA Invades Afghanistan, October 7, 2001
Petroleum, Entertainment, Non-Essential Goods, Travel and Tourism, Real Estate and
Construction, Insurance, Finance and Banking.
Kidnapping of Daniel Pearl, January 23, 2002
Travel and Tourism.
Car Bomb Explosion in Bali, October 12, 2002
Travel and tourism.
Official Start of “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, March 19, 2003
Petroleum, Entertainment, Non-Essential Goods, Travel and Tourism, Real Estate and
Construction, Insurance, Finance and Banking.
Train Bombings in Spain, 11 March 2004
Entertainment, Travel and Tourism, Insurance, Finance and Banking.
Bus and Train Bombings in London, July 7, 2005, and July 21, 2005
Entertainment, Travel and Tourism, Insurance, Finance and Banking.
Train Bombings in India, July 11, 2006
Travel and Tourism.
Coordinated Car Bombings in Iraq, August 14, 2007
Petroleum, Insurance, Finance and Banking.
Bin laden Killed in Targeted Operation in Pakistan, May 2, 2011
Petroleum.
Embassy Attack and Death of US Ambassador in Libya, September 11, 2012
Petroleum, Travel and Tourism, Finance and Banking.
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